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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ASSIGNMENTS-ASSIGNMENT OF AN' EXPEcTANCY.-J oseph and James were
two of six children. A contract wioiessed "that Joseph Snyder has sold to
James Sny~er one undivided sixth of the real estate owned by the mother,
Susan Snyder; to secure said interest to James after her death, the mother
unites in the conveyance of said interest. The said Joseph warrants and
defends the interest from all claims." The contract was signed by Joseph
and by the mother. Held, Joseph had no estate which he could convey, and
the contract, though made with the consent of the mother, was unenforceable either in law or in equity as against him. But the contract, though
joined in by Joseph, who had no interest, was effective as a conveyance to
James by the mother of a one-sixth interest of her estate in remainder.
Joseph should be allowed to share equally with the others in the remaining
five-sixths of the estate, after deducting the consideration money paid to
him, which should be considered as an advancement." Snyder v. Snyder
(Ky., I92I), 235 S. W. 743·
At common law, "if a son bargain and sell the inheritance of his father,
this. is void, because he hath no right in himself." Co. Litt. 265. The more
general rule in equity is that the transaction will be enforced against the
heir as a contract to convey as soon as the title of the heir becomes absolute,
1f the contract is supported by ~ fair consideration. Whelm v. Phillips, I5I
Pa. 3I2; Crum v. Sawyer, I32 Ill. 443; Pierce v. Robinson, I3 Cal. I23.
Several jurisdictions hold that equity will not enforce the transaction unless
it be entered into with the assent of the parent. The reason given is that
it is a fraud on the parent who, if he had known that his property was
going to a stranger, might have disp~sed of it in some other way. M cClttre
v. Rabe1i, I33 Ind. 507; Bo31nton v. H1tbbard, 7 Mass. II2; Alves v. Schles·
inger, 8I Ky. 29I. Equity may give effect to the transaction if based merely
upon a quit-claim deed. Clendening v. Wyatt, 54 Kans. 523. If the deed
is a warranty deed, a much stronger case is presented and the heir is
estopped, as against his grantee, to claim the interest which he subsequently
acquires. Bank v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528; Steele v. Frierso1i, 85 Tenn.
430. The principal case, where the contract was based on a fair consideration, assented to by the parent, and warranted by the expectant heir, is as
strong a case as there could be for giving effect to the intended transfer
by Joseph to James; yet the majority of the court held that, as between
them, nothing passed. A well-reasoned dissenting opinion argues that the
transaction should be considered as a conveyance by the mother of a onesixth interest in her estate to Joseph and a conveyance of this by him to
James, thus giving effect to the intention of the parties and doing justice
to the other four children with whom Joseph is allowed to share under the
majority opinion. Would it not be still better for Kentucky to go one step
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farther than the principle contended for in the dissenting opinion, and adopt
the more general equity rule, directly giving effect to the contract for the
transfer of an expectancy, so long as it has been entered into fairly?
CARRI£RS-BAGGAGE-UNNEcESSARY FoR. PASSENGER 'to TRAVEL oN TicKJW.

-P purchased a ticket for passage on D's railroad from Addyston to Cincinnati. From the latter place she could take D's through train, which did
not stop at Addyston, to her destination in Michigan. She. checked her
trunk in the evening, intending herself to follow the next morning. It
being more convenient, however, to take an interurban to Cincinnati, she
did this and destroyed the ticket for passage on D's road. At Cincinnati
she bought a ticket over D's road to Michigan. On arrival at her destination it was discovered that her trunk had been stolen from D's station at
Addyston on the preceding evening. In a suit by P it was held, that when
she purchased the ticket over D's road and checked her trunk the relation
was in effect that of passenger and carrier, and D was liable as an insurer
for the subsequent loss, though P did not travel on her ticket. Caine v.
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (Mich., I92I), I85 N. W. 765.
The rule upheld by the earlier cases on this subject seems to have been
that the passenger must accompany his baggage. The Elvira Harbeck, 2
Blatchf. 336; Graffam v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 67 Me. 234; 3 Hu'tCHINSON, CARRIERS (Ed. 3), -§ I275· "Baggage implies a passenger who intends
to go upon the train with his baggage." Marshall v. Po1~tiac, 0. & N. R.
Co., I26 Mich. 45, 55 L. R. A. 650. In that case one purchased a ticket for
the sole purpose of checking his baggage, later selling the ticket, and it was
held that the railroad was only liable as a gratuitous bailee. The holding
was not free from criticism, and though approved and followed by some
courts-Perry v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., I7I N. C. IS8; Carlisle v.
Grand Tnmk R. W. Co., 25 Ont. L. Rep. 372; Wood v. M. C.R. R. Co.,
98 Me. g8--it was disapproved and repudiated by others-M cKibbin v. Wisconsin C. R. Co., IOO Minn. 270; Alabama Gt. Southeni R. Co. v. Kno.1:, I84
Ala. 485, I2 MICH. L. Rev. 409. See also Larned v. Cmtral R. Co., Sr N. ].
L. 571, 9 MICH. L. Rev. 707. In the principal case the question arose for
the first time in Michigan since the decision of the Marshall case twenty
years before. Four justices undertook to distinguish the cases on the ground
that in the Marshall case the loss occurred at the destination, the plaintiff
not being there to receive the baggage, while in the principal case the loss
at the point where the trunk was accepted, the plaintiff being ready at the
destination to receive it; and on the further ground that in the Marshall
case the plaintiff intended to deceive the railroad as to his riding on its
train, while here there was no evidence of deception. Four justices considered the Marshall case as squarely overruled. The cases might have
been further distinguished on the ground that in the Marshall case the
plaintiff had sold his ticket and was having his baggage carried without
cost to himself, while here the plaintiff destroyed her ticket and was fully
paying- the railroad for its service in transporting her baggage. Under
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the old methods of transportation there was some reason for saying that a
passenger must accompany his baggage so that he might look after it in
case of emergency or immediately claim it on his arrival at his destination.
But in modern times the reasons for the old rule no longer apply. Baggage
is in the exclusive control of the carrier and is often not even carried on
passenger trains. The carrying of baggage is no longer a matter of grace,
but is a distinct duty of the carrier, and a ticket entitles the purchaser not
only to be carried but to have his baggage carried as well. Having paid both
privileges, it is difficult to see why the buyer must avail himself of both to
have the benefit of one. See 1Alabama Gt. Southern R. Co. v. Knox, supra.
CoNTRACTs~AGENCY-Is AUTHORIZATION To S!lr;r, LAND ON CoMMrssroN

MERE R.EvocABLE OFFJ>R.-Action for breach of contract: P (a broker)
alleged as the basis of the contract that he had received from D a written
instrument giving him "exclusive sale" of certain property, and that he
had spent time and money in reasonable efforts to procure a purchaser. The
instrument in question was entitled a "contract" in its head-note, but it was
simply an exclusive authorization to sell on commission basis (no time limit
set), and was signed solely by D. Held, facts sufficiently set out a contract.
Harriso1i v. lYfcPherso1i (Conn., 1922), II5 Atl. 723.
A

•

The court regarded the instrument as an offer of employment, and the
work and expense undergone in reliance thereon as an acceptance. The
propriety of the holding must depend upon what sort of a contract and
acceptance the offer contemplated. If it merely contemplated a unilateral
contract to pay a certain commission in case P produced a purchaser, then
there was no contract formed for lack of both acceptance and consideration.
But the offer might in substance and effect, even though not expressly, be
to pay a certain commission in case of sale if the broker put the property
en his books or in his lists or advertisements, etc. Here also the offer
would contemplate a unilateral contract, but the act of acceptance would
be the preliminary work of listing the property, or doing whatever else the
offer called for. If the instant case had been decided on the construction
of the particular offer involved, we might question the validity of the court's
construction, but not of the law laid down. In this event it would simply
be in line 'with the strong desire courts in general seem to manifest in
working out a valid contractual basis in these brokerage cases. Goward v.
Waters, g8 Mass. 59(5; Attix v. Phelan, 5 Iowa 336; Axe v. Tolbert, I79'
Mich. 556; Rowa1i v. .H11ll, 55 W. Va. 335. It does not appear, however,
that the court put its decision upon the construction of the particular offer
made by this defendant. Apparently the court lays down the broad rule
that where an authority to sell on commission is given, and the offeree makes
a reasonable effort to procure a purchaser and spends time and money in
so doing, there is a contract formed that requires the offer of commission
to be kept open for the time stipulated, or, if none is stipulated, for a reasonable time. The exact basis and nature of this contract is not clear. It
certainly is somewhat difficult to square with the general theory governing
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offers to unilateral contracts, and a recent New Jersey· case emphatically
repudiates it. Ettinger v. Loux, II5 Atl. 384 The court in the latter case
insists that such an authority is merely an offer toward a unilateral contract, to be accepted by finding a purchaser, and subject to revocation like
any other simple offer prior to acceptance by performance. of the act contemplated. But so extensive is this solicitude for the broker that: what we might
term the "mere assumption" of the existence of a contract is not altogether
uncommon in these cases. Gregory v. Bon11ey, 135 Cal. 589; Harrison v.
A11gerson, II5 Ill. App. 226 (a case almost identical with Ettinger v. Loiex,
supra); Hartford v. McGillicudy, 103 Me. 224; Hartwick v. Marsh, g6 Ark.
23; Black v. Snook, 204 Pa. u9. It is probably but another illustration of
the gro\~ing inclination to restrict the offeror's right to revoke in these cases,
by treating it as a bilateral contract and the offeree's commencement of performance as the counter promise, Rowaii v. Hi,ll, siepra; Lapron v. Flint,
86 Minn. 376, semble (compare argument in Offord v. Davies, 12 C. B. N. S.
748) ; or by implying in effect a collateral offer to keep the principal offer
open, whenever the act of acceptance required by the latter will necessarily involve time and expense for its performance. Jaekel v. Caldwell, 156 Pa.
266; Dodge v. Childers, 167 Mo. App. 448. Professor McGovney advances
this latter theory with considerable plausibility in an article in 27 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 654 and Sir Frederick Pollock, in 28 LAw QUARTERLY R.Ev. IOI, maintains strenuously that the right of revocation in these cases ought not as a
matter of principle, and does not as a matter of fact, exist. Sir Frederick
answers the objection of logical difficulties by insisting that "law exists for
the convenience of mankind, not for the training of logicians." Excellent
discussions of the problem appear in 26 YALE L. J. 193-196; WILLIS'tON ON
CONTRACTS, § 60, and MitcHEM ON AGENCY (with reference to brokerage
cases), § 2451 et seq.
CoNTRACTs-lND!WINlTE W AIV!tR oF STATUTE oF LIMI'l'A'l'lONs.-Plaintiff
executed his promissory note with a provision waiving all his rights under
the statute of limitations. After the lapse of the statutory period from the
maturity of the note, the defendant brought suit and recovered judgment.
In an action to set the judgment aside, held, the provision waiving the statute, since it was for an indefinite time, was void. First National Bank v.
Mock (Colo., 1922), 203 Pac. 272.
Whether or not an agreement to waive the benefit of the statute of limitations is valid is in dispute. Those courts which hold that such an agreement is void do so on the ground that the statute of limitations, being a
statute of repose, is essential to the security of all men, and that it would
be contrary to public policy to allow parties to waive: its benefits. Wright
v. Gardner, 98 Ky. 454; Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503; Ann. Gas. 1916 A 686.
On the other hand, the courts which hold that such an agreement is valid
say that no principle of public policy is violated because the statute of limitations was designed for the benefit of the debtor, and if he wishes to
contract away this privilege he may do so. Parschen v. Chessma1i, 49 Mont.
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326; Quick v. Corlies, 39 N. J. L. II; State Trust Co. v. Sheldoit, 68 Vt. 259.
In those jurisdictions in which it is held that such an agreement does not
contravene public policy the question has arisen as to the length of time
for which a waiver, indefinite in terms, is operative. In Maim v. Cooper,
2 App. Cas. (D. C.) 226, and State Trust Co. v. Sheldon, supra, it is held
that a waiver for an indefinite time operates to remove the bar of the
statute permanently. Other cases hold that such a waiver is effective only
for a reasonable time after the statute has run,-to at least for a period
equal to that provided by the statute relating to the cause of action in
question. Parschen v. Chessmai~, supra. The more common rule is to treat
such an agreement as operative for the same term as it would be if it were
a new promise to pay the debt. See l WII.LISTON ON CoN'tRAC'l'S, 376. Such
a rule would not, however, extend the time at all if the waiver were a part
of the original transaction.
CoN'tRAC'l's-S1umCE AS AccSP'.l'ANCE oF AN OFFSR.-Defendant company
issued a life insurance policy to one B, naming the plaintiff as beneficiary.
B allowed the policy to lapse by failing to pay the second premium. Agents
of the defendant company solicited reinstatement and obtained the signature of B to an application and a note for the premium, giving him assurance at the time that upon receipt of his note and application the company
would reinstate the policy. The note and application were then sent in to
the actuary of the company, who later returned the note to the agent, stating
that it could not be received in payment. B was not notified and the note
was not returned to him. He died six weeks later and plaintiff brought
action on the policy. Held, that the agent's failure to return the note and
communicate the rejection amounted to an assent to the reinstatement application. Lechler v. Montana Life Ins. Co. (N. D., 1921), 186 N. W. 271.
It is generally held that an offeree has a right to make no reply to offers,
and that his silence and inaction cannot be construed as an assent to the
offer. This is true even though the offer states that silence will be taken
as consent, for the offerer cannot prescribe conditions of rejections so as
to turn silence on the part of the offeree into acceptance. Beach v. U. S.,
226 U. S. 243; Royal Ins. Co. v. Beatty, n9 Pa. 6; Prescott v. Jones, 69
N. H. 305; Grice v. Noble, 59 Mich. 515. Silence or inaction, however,
may amount to assent to an offer for a unilateral contract, where the offer
calls for inaction on the part of the offeree. See WILLISTON ON CoN'tRAC'l'S,
§ 135. Where the offer contemplates a bilateral contract the courts look
upon the situation somewhat differently. But even in this class of cases
there may be situ·ations in which the relations between the parties have been
such as to justify the offerer in expecting a reply, so that the offeree's silence
will be considered to be an acceptance. Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., 158
Mass. 194; House v. Beak, 141 Ill. 290; Emery v. Cob,bey, 27 Neb. 621;
Orme v. Cooper, l Ind. App. 449; Cole-Mcintyre-Norfleet Co. v. Holloway,
214 S. W. 817. So, also, where the offeree has come under a duty to return
money or property in his possession belonging to the offerer, or to accept
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an offer for its purchase, silence and failure to return the property will
amount to an assent to buy it Wheeler v. Klaholt, 178 Mass. 141; T11mer
v. Machine & F. Co., 97 Mich. 166; Butler v. School Dist., 149 Pa. St. 351.
Acceptance may also be inferred from silence where goods are sent to
another without request and are used and dealt with as his own. A common illustration of this is where newspapers and periodicals are sent to one
who has not subscribed to them or whose subscription has ceased. Austin
v. Burge, 156 Mo. App. 286; Fogg v. Portsmouth Atheneum, 44 N. H. ns;
Goodland v. Leclair, 78 Wis. 176. Under the circumstances of the principal
case the court was justified in holding that there was a duty to notify the
policyholder of the rejection and that a failure to do so amounted to an
acceptance of the application.
CRIMES-Ex'l'RADI'l'ION-EFFEC'l' OF ILLEGAL DEPOR'l'A'l'ION.-The petitioner
was convicted of manslaughter in Oklahoma and fled to Mexico. He was
illegally ejected by lVIexican officials and was immediately arrested and placed
in confinement in California. Habeas corpus proceedings being begun, the
petitioner contended that he was not subject to arrest and extradition because
United States and Mexican officials had conspired to bring him into California, and had done so without complying with the deportation laws of
Mexico. Held: Had the United States officials conspired to bring the prisoner within the limits of the United States, he would not be subject to
arrest, but as the evidence did not show this the petitioner was properly
held, regardless of any irregularities committed by Mexican officials. In 1"e
Jones (Cal., 1921), 201 Pac. 944.
The rule as laid down in the principal case that irregularities of a surrendering state alone are immaterial seems to be without conflict in the
cases. E;; parte Wilson, 63 Tex. Crim. 281. But the dictum to the effect
that if the state in which the crime was committed participated in those
irregularities, and jurisdiction was obtained by force or fraud, the offender
wouid not be deemed within the state, is not in accord with the majority
of cases. The general rule is that a court trying a person for a crime committed within its jurisdiction will not investigate the manner of his capture
in case he has fled to a foreign country and has been returned to the jurisdiction. £;; parte Barker, 87 Ala. 4; Ker v. Illinois, II9 U. S. 436; Klingen
v. Kelly, 3 Wyo. 566. These cases proceed upon the theory that the only
question before the court is that of the defendant's guilt. That if any wrong
has been committed it is a wrong against the state from which he was illegally taken, and those guilty must answer to the party aggrieved, which is
not the defendant. A few courts have held, however, that where the officers
of a state in which a crime has been committed have invaded the sovereignty
of another state, and have wrongfully brought the offender back, the state
acquires no jurisdiction. State v. Simmons, 39 Kans. 262; In re Robinson,
29 Neb. 135· These courts justify their conclusion upon the grounds of
public policy. The court in State v. Simmons, supra, said: "Not only would
the special wrong be committed against the individual, but it would be a
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general wrong· to society itself-a violation of those fundamental principles
of mutual trust and confidence which lie at the very foundation of all organized society, and which are necessary in the very nature of things to hold
society together."
Cru:M1'S-MANSLAUGH'tER AS RJtsUL'l' OF AN Ac::r MALUM PROHIBI'l'UM
ONLY.-Defendant, apparently through failure of service brake, lost control over the speed of his automobile on a steep down-grade. In passing
a street car letting off passengers at the foot of the grade, defendant's automobile, then traveling at an estimated speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour,
struck and killed deceased. Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and appealed. The judgment on the counts based on the commission of an unlawful act was reversed because of the unconstitutionality
of certain statutes and a defect in the indictment, and it was held reversible
error for the judge to omit to charge the jury, without request, the law
relating to the crime of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a
lawful act without due caution. McDonald v. State (Ga., 1921), 109 S. E. 656.
The general rule is that the unlawful act must be mafam ii~ se, and not
merely malmn prohibitmn, in order to sustain a conviction for involuntary
manslaughter. 21 CYc. 765; Com. v. Adams, II4 Mass. 323; State v. Horto1i,
139 N. C. 588. Convictions for manslaughter based upon violations of laws
regulating speed and establishing traffic rules are, however, becoming increas. ingly common, and this class of cases may be said to form a now wellrecognized exception. State v. Rountree, 181 N. C. 535; State v. M clvor .
(Del., 1920), III Atl. 616; Madding v. State: u8 Ark. 5o6; People v. Camberis, 297 Ill. 455. · "It is, however, practically agreed, without regard to
this distinction, that if the act is a violation of a statute intended and
designed to prevent injury to the person, and is in itself dangerous and
death "ensues, that the person violating the statute is guilty of manslaughter
at least, and under certain circumstances of murder." State v. M elver, 175
N. C. 76!. Where the defendant is not exceeding the speed limit, or that
fact is in doubt, it is generally held that, to be criminally liable, he must
have .been guilty of gross or wanton negligence. People v. Adams, 289 Ill.
339; State v. Long, 30 Del. 397, which was the proximate cause of the death.
Dunville v. State, 188 Ind. 373. As suggested in State v. Mclver, supra, the
basis for the recognition of this exception is public policy, in view of the
constant danger to travelers on the highways from the ever increasing automobile traffic. It is to be noted that the facts in the instant case are unusual,
and if the jury should find the defendant not guilty under instructions as
to the crime of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act
without due caution, it is doubtful if he could properly be convicted under
the other counts.
EQUI'l'Y-CANC1'LLA'l'ION B1'CAUSS OF MIS'l'AKE.-The defendant, who was
the owner of the majority of the stock in the Banker's Trust Company,
entered into a contract to sell his holdings to the plaintiff. Subsequently
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a shortage of $17,000 was discovered in the assets of the company, due to
the defalcation of a bookkeeper. This shortage, which had been concealed
by false entries in the books, materially reduced the value of the stock. The
plaintiff thereupon sued for cancellation of the contract on the ground of
mutual mistake as to the assets. Held, since there was a clear case of bona
fide mistake regarding material facts, without culpable negligence on the
part of the person complaining, there is such mistake as to warrant a decree
of cancellation. Lindberg v. M1trray (Wash., 1!)21), 201 Pac. 759.
The parties were mistaken as to the facts creating the inducement to
contract. An error, and possibly a material one, was made as to the facts
which determined the value of the shares. Such an error is usually termed
a mistake as to collateral matter to distinguish it from a mistake as to the
identity or existence of the subject matter of the sale. To determine
whether or not such a mistake should have the legal effect of justifying
cancellation, the Washington court declared that. "the true test in cases
involving mutual mistake of fact is whether the contract would have been
entered into had there been no mistake." This test is far more comprehensive than that generally accepted by courts of equity in such cases. In discussing the legal effect of various kinds of mistake, the New York court
has said : "There are many extrinsic facts surrounding every business transaction which have an important bearing and influence upon its results. * * *
In such cases, if a court of equity could intervene and grant relief because
a party was mistaken as to such a fact as would nave prevented him from
entering the transaction if he had known the truth, there would be such
uncertainty and instability in contracts as to lead to much embarrassment."
Dambmaim v. Schulting, 75 N. Y. 55. Influenced by these considerations,
the Minnesota court in the recent case of Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109,
on facts almost identical to those of the principal case, refused to cancel
the contract, saying: "A mistake relating merely to the attributes, quality
or value of the subject of a sale does not warrant rescission." This view
is quite the antithesis of that of the principal case, and, if strictly adhered
to, would be nearly as objectionable. That a mistake as to quality or value
will, in fact, warrant cancellation, at least in extraordinary cases, is well
illustrated by Sherwood v. W:alker, 66 Mich. 568. The most satisfactory
solution of the problem involves taking a position somewhere between the
two extremes above indicated. This middle ground is well expressed in the
leading English case of Kennedy v. Panama, etc., Mail Co., L. R. 2 Q. B.
580, where the court, in discussing the legal effect of mistake, said that the
problem "in every case is to determine whether the mistake or misapprehension is as to the substance of the whole consideration, going, as it were,
to the root of the matter, or only to some point, even though a material
point, an error as to which does not affect the substance of the whole consideration." In other words, a mistake should go to the very essence of
the contract to justify cancellation by a court of equity. This is obviously
quite different from a mere mistake as to a fact, a knowledge of which
would have prevented the contract. Furthermore, the determination of the
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question cannot be accomplished by the application of a geometrical test
such as that suggested in the principal case, but, again to quote the words
of the English court, it "must depend upon the construction of the contract
and the particular circumstances of the particular case." According to
Holmes, C. ]., in Dedhm1i Natl. Bank v. Everett Natl. Bank, 177 Mass. 392,
"the ground of recovery * * * under a mistake of fact is that the existence
0£ the fact supposed was the conventional basis or tacit condition of the
transaction." The Washington court will be compelled to recede from its
position in the principal case unless it intends to extend relief to a vast
number of cases of mistake which have not been generally recognized as
warranting the interposition of equity.
EQUITY-INJUNCTION AGAINS't UsuRPA'tION oF OFFICER'S DuTms.-The
charter of Oklahoma City vested the powers of city government in five
comm1ss1oners. One provision of the charter placed the police department
under the supervision of the mayor. Another provision authorized the
commission by a vote of four to one to "transfer duties from, one commissioner and from one department to, another commissioner and another department." By such a vote the control of the police department was transferred
from the mayor to the commissioner of accounting and finance. Upon a
bill for an injunction, held, the charter could not be construed to empower
the commissioners to make this transfer, and equity had jurisdiction to
enjoin the assumption of authority over the police. , Walton v. Donnelly
(Okla., I92I), 201 Pac. 367.
The court drew attention to the fact that it was not called upon to
determine the complainant's title to his office, and placed its decision upon
the ground that there was no legal remedy, because information in the
nature of quo warranto was confined to the determination of title to office,
and could not be used to determine who should perform particular official
duties. The scope of a q110 warranto proceeding is generally regarded as
so limited. HIGH, ExTRAORDINARY LEGAr, REMEDIES, § 618. Q110 warranto
was held not to be the proper remedy to prevent city officers from levying
and collecting ta..xes beyond the city limits. People v. Whitcomb, 55 Ill. 172.
Injunction and not quo warranto was held to be the proper remedy to prevent the county tax collector from paying into the county treasury taxes
levied upon city property. Sanderso1i v. Texarkana, 103 Ark. 529. In a
recent case, however, a writ of prohibition was granted to prevent the 'Circuit court from assuming jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain the
circuit judges from classifying the deputies in county offices, under a statute
authorizing this, the injunction being asked upon the ground that the statute
was unconstitutional. The reasons given were (I) that equity has no jurisdiction to restrain political acts; (2) the legal remedy by proceeding in quo
warranto was available, because the statute giving the remedy of q110 war·
ranto made it available to protect "franchises," and in its broad sense a
franchise may include the right of a public officer to perform official duties
as well as the rights of corporations. State v. Dawson (Mo., 1920), 224
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S. \V. 824 An injunction was refused on the same ground in Cochraii v.
McCleary, 22 Iowa 75. Equity will enjoin the ouster of an officer without
a proper hearing at law, and, without trying the title to an office as between
rival claimants, will protect its enjoyment. Kerr v. Trego, 47 Pa. 292; see
20 MICH. L. Rl>v. 238. But it is clear that in the principal case the court
decided upon the disputed right of the complainant to e.'i:ercise certain duties
claimed as appurtenant to his office, and the assumption of jurisdiction as
to this political question can be justified, in view of equity's traditional attitude toward political questions, only upon the ground given· that the legal
remedy of quo warranto is not available for the purpose.
EQUITY-UNCONSCIONABI.~ CONTRACT CANC~tn.-The plaintiff had a
deposit in a trust company of $22,500, of which he had lost all recollection
because of an illness which had resulted in a loss of memory. A company
official who knew of the plaintiff's mental condition, and alsc, by reason of
his connection with the company, of the deposit, concealed from the plaintiff
his official connection and induced him to contract to pay nearly one-half
of the sum as consideration for revealing its whereabouts. Later the plaintiff sued for cancellation of the contract. There was no claim of mental
incapacity to contract. Held, because of the abnormal condition of the
plaintiff's mind, and also because of the semi-confidential position which
the defendant occupied with respect to the plaintiff, equity would give the
desired relief. Giertli v. Fidelity Trust Company (N. J., 1921), 115 At!. 3!)7·

The case was well decided on either of the two bases suggested by the
court. As to the effect of the plaintiff's mental condition, although there
was no claim that he was mentally incompetent to contract, yet his illness
had materially weakened his mental powers and impaired his power of selfprotection. In such cases, especially when coupled with inadequacy of consideration, equity will give relief, even though neither the mental impairment nor the inadequacy of consideration, standing alone, would suffice.
Courts are particularly willing to refuse specific performance against a
defendant so afflicted. Blackwilder v. Loveless, 21 Ala. 371. But it is also
well settled that, in cases of sufficient hardship, affirmative relief by way o!
cancellation will be given. M a1m v. B1ttterly, 21 Vt. 326; Maddox v. Sim11w11s, 31 Ga. 512. The decision in the principal case is warranted on this
ground. The other ground suggested by the court, namely, the defendant's
semi-confidential" position with respect to the plaintiff, pr!!sents more difficulty. The case is somewhat analogous to those cases in which the directors of corporations have purchased shares from non-official shareholders,
either concealing their identity as directors or withholding information material to the value of the shares. The earlier cases refused to recognize the
"duty to disclose" under such circumstances. In 1847 Chief Justice Shaw
said, "The directors are not the bailees, agents, factors, or trustees of the
individual stockholders." Smith v. H1wd, 12 Met. (Mass.) 371. But in
1904, in Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, the Supreme Court, recognizing
that the earlier rule opened the door to most inequitable impositions, decided

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
that, "If it were conceded that the ordinary relations between directors and
shareholders are not of such a fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of
the director to disclose to the shareholder general knowledge which he possesses in regard to the shares before he purchases, yet there are cases where
by reason of the special facts the duty does exist." A few cases of a still
later date have gone even further and have held that there is a duty to disclose, though no "special facts'; exist. Dawso1i v. National Life Ins. Co.,
I76 Ia. 362. See 8 MICH. L. R.Ev. 267, and I9 MICH. L. R.Ev. 6g8. In the
principal case the defendant's official connection with the trust company
might well place him in the same semi-fiduciary position as that of the
director, A state of facts somewhat similar to those of the principal case
was presented in- Jones v. Stewart, 62 Neb. 207. The plaintiff had forgotten
the existence of a certain bank deposit, and the defendant, who knew about
it, though he was not connected with the bank, induced the plaintiff, as consideration for the conveyance of some relatively worthless land, to assign
the deposit to him by executing the necessary papers without reading them.
When the plliintiff learned what he had done he sued the defendant in
case for deceit: A decision for the defendant was predicated upon the
fact that the parties had contracted on equal terms and that there was no
-fiduciary relationship between them. The plaintiff's position was somewhat
weaker than that of the plaintiff in the principal case because there was no
evidence of an abnormal mental condition, nor was the defendant connected
in any way with the bank. So, in spite of the imposition on the plaintiff
which would have made a decree granting relief seem equitable, the two
cases may be distinguished.
EvIDENc:E-CHARACTER WITNESSES IN SUPPORT OF VERACITY.-Testimony
of the accused, who was his own_ witness in a trial for robbery, was directly
contradictory to the testimony of a witness for the state. Held, accused
was entitled to support his evidence by calling character witnesses to sustain his general reputation for truth and veracity. Smith v. State (Okla.
Cr. App., I922), 202 Pac. 1046.

o

The court takes the broad stand that when the veracity of the witness
is in any mamier called into question character witnesses in support of same
may be introduced. The only authorities cited are three prior decisions
by the same court, Friel v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 532; Gilbert v. State, 8 Okla.
Cr. 329; Davidson v. State, I5 Okla. Cr. 85; and in only one of the three (Gilbert v. State) is the question directly raised and discussed. None of these
cases discuss the earlier contra holding by the supreme court of the state,
which at that time was the court of last resort in criminal as well as in
civil appeals. First National Bank v. Blakeman, 19 Okla. Io6. This may
result in having one rule enforced in criminal cases and another in civil
cases. As a general rule, however, no such distinction is recognized. There
certainly is no logical basis for it. The same objections so clearly pointed
out in Tedens v. Sclmmers, !I2 Ill. 263, 266, apply in both cases, viz., that
the trial would become interminable, and the main issues befogged perhaps
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by the large number of side issues with respect to the veracity of witnesses.
The cogency of these objections has determined the issue in all but a very
few jurisdictions. Gertz v. Fitchburg R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78; Farr v.
Thompso1~, Cheves (S. C.) 37; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. M'Clish, 115 Fed.
268; Texas & P.R. Co. v. Raney, 86 Tex. 363; Jacobs v. State, 42 Tex. Cr.
353. [A very recent Te.'\:as decision in a civil action is in accord with the
principal case. Davis v. Hudson, 135 S. W. 1107. The earlier Texas view,
however, is with the general rule; and since the later case was not in the
court of last resort, nor the point discussed, its weight would appear to be
negligible.] But in at least one jurisdiction following the general rule the
courts have permitted exceptions under special circumstances. State v.
DeWolf, 8 Conn. 92; Merriam v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 20 Conn. 354And perhaps with perfect consistency with the spirit and reasons for the
rule, an exception might be made where the accused in a criminal trial is a
witness in his own behalf. When the crime charged involves any moral turpitude the very fact that the accused is being tried for such a crime involves
a direct and serious attack upon his credibility as a witness, and evidence
of his reputation for veracity might properly be admissible. But see Spurr
v. U. S., 87 Fed. 701, 713, contra.
~

Evrmmce-fus GESTAJ;.-In a trial for murder the statement by the
deceased that "a stranger shot (him)," made in reply to a question by a
police official, was admitted in evidence. It appeared that the statement was
made immediately after the deceased recovered his speech, although about
thirty minutes had elapsed since the shooting. Upon appeal, it was held
admissible as part of the res gestae. Commonwealth v. Pimtario (Penn.,
i922), II5 Atl. 831.
The instant case is supposed to be representative of an exception to the
hearsay rule which Mr. Wigmore confesses to approach "with a feeling akin
to despair." 3 WIGMORS ON Ev., § 1745. That courts style such statements
res gestae is not especially illuminating. The use of this phrase "is apt to
lead to confusion with the Verbal Act doctrine under which extra-judicial
statements are admissible to explain or give color to otherwise equivocal
acts which they accompany, and so-called spontaneous statements which get
their prob~tive value from the fact that the declarant is under some nervous
shock and has very slight opportunity for fabrication. As to how nearly
contemporaneous with the transaction to which it refers the statement must
be no rule can be given. Kennedy v. R. Co., 130 N. Y. 654 Very much
must be left to the discretion of the trial court. State v .. Ah Loi, 5 Nev. 101.
That the declarant has been without the power of articulation in the meantime, as in the principal case, has often been deemed important. Lewis v.
State, 29 Tex. A. 201 (one and a half hours); E.by v. Ins. Co., 258 Pa. 525
(fifteen minutes or more). The reason for this is not altogether obvious,
for inability to speak is apt to encourage premeditated rather than spontaneous statements after speech is regained. What the law distrusts is not
after-speech but after-thought. Ins. Co. v. Sheppard; 85 Ga. 751; Green v.
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State, 154 Ind. 655. ~ It is submitted that the statement in the instant case
cannot be brought within the Verbal Act doctrine because the transaction to
which it referred was completed and unequivocal; nor can it properly be
treated as a spontaneous statement, because it appears to have been a deliberate answer to a question after the lapse of considerable time. .However,
some of the authorities already cited support the decision. For an e..°'l:tensive
note on the subject see 42 L. R. A. (n. s.) 198.
FALSE IMPRISONllU<:NT-CONSENT AS A DtFENSE.-Defendants with others
went to the house where the plaintiff was staying and forcibly entered. The
plaintiff resisted at first, but was induced to go with the defendants, by
whom he was taken to the state line. He was there assaulted. In an action
for assault and battery and false imprisonment the court instructed the jury
that the plaintiff could not recover for anything done prior to the assault,
on the theory that the plaintiff had consented to everything done before that
time. Held, the instruction was erroneous. Meints v. Hmitington, 276
Fed. 245.
The instruction was held to be erroneous not only because based on a
conclusion of fact, the determinition of ·which should have been left to the
jury, but also because it was an inaccurate statement of the law. It was
held to be inaccurate on the theory that consent is no defense to an action
for false imprisonment. The only cases cited to sustain this position were
cases of assault and battery. As a general rule, in an action for assault
and battery, if what is done amounts to a breach of the peace or is forbidden on public grounds, consent is no defense. Stout v. Wren, 8 N. C. 420;
Shay v. Thompson, 59 Wis. 540; Morris v. Miller, 20 L. R. A. (n. s.), 907,
note. It may, however, be shown in mitigation of damages. Barholt v.
Wright, 45 Ohio St. 177. The theory is that the state is involved and there
can be no defense based on a breach of the Jaw. COOLEY ON TORTS (Ed. 2)
188. For a criticism of this rule and the reasons underlying it with respect
to cases of mutual combat, see Galbraith v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 403; Smith
v. Sim01~, 69 Mich. 481; Lykins v. Hamrick, 144 Ky. So. Conceding the
soundness of the rule, it is of doubtful application in a case of false
imprisonment, since the gist of the action is the detention of the plaintiff
without his consent, and there is no legal wrong unless the detention was
involuntary in the sense of being contrary to the will of the plaintiff. Consent given before the alleged detention took place was held to· be a defense
in the following cases: Moses v. Dubois (S. C.), Dudley 209; Houston &
T. C. R. Co. v. Roberson, 138 S. W. 822; Ellis v. Cleveland, 54 Vt. 437.
The result reached in the principal case is the correct one, but may be more
properly based upon a proposition to which all authorities will agree, namely,
that a detention sufficient to support an action for false imprisonment may
arise despite submission if the circumstances are such as to induce an apprehension that force will be used. There is no obligation to incur the risk
of personal violence by resisting until actual violence is used. Comer v.
Knowles, 17 Kan. 436; ·Pike v. Hanson, 9 N. H. 491. That the court in the
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principal case had in mind a submission to a show of force appears from
its consideration of the evidence. To call a submission to a show of force
consent is a misuse of terms, and the further statement that consent is no
defense to an action of false imprisonment was unnecessary to the decision
of the case and is not sustained by the authorities.
lNJUNCTION-RlGH'l.' OF ATTORNEY TO CONSULT WITH Cr.IEN'J.' CONFINED IN
JAII..-A cJ.ient of P, an attorney, was confined in a county jail. Notwithstanding P's repeated efforts to see her, D, the sheriff in charge of the jail,
arbitrarily refused to permit P to see or consult with her client. On a petition for an: injunction against D, the court held that an attorney has the
, right to be allowed, without undue or arbitrary restraint, to consult with
clients confined in a jail, and that an injunction may be granted to enforce
the right. Wilma11s v. Harsto1~ (Tex., I92I), 234 S. W. 233.
A person confined in jail clearly has the right to consult with his attorney at reasonable times. State v. Davis, 9 Okla. Cr. Rep. 94; People v.
Risely, I N. Y. Cr. Rep. 492; Hamilto1i v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. Rep. 419 (involving a statute). But see Ki11locli v. Harvey, I I S. C. 326. It would seem
that an attorney had a reciprocal right to see his client, and it has been so
held. fa the Matter of the Sheriff, etc., I Wheeler Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 303.
The principal case clearly states this right, but the report does not show
on what basis the court took jurisdiction to enforce the right by injunction.
Assuming the general rule to be that injunctions are only granted when a
right of property is involved (but see 29 HARV. L. Rev. 640), it would seem,
nevertheless, that such a right was clearly present here. "The right of a
citizen to pursue any calling, business, or profession he may choose is a
property right to be guarded by equity as zealously as any other form of
property." New Method La1t11dry Co. v. MacCa11it, I74 Cal. 26. An attorney's right to his clientele and to carry on his profession is one of substance,
and a direct violation of that right, like that in the principal case, would
obviously result in a certain pecuniary loss to him. Equity may refuse to
enjoin an injury to reputati'on only. Mead v. Stirling, 62 Conn. 586; litdso1i
v. Zurhorst, 30 Ohio C. C. 9. But courts of equity have often gone much
farther than the principal case in finding a property right on which to base
their jurisdiction, as when the publication of private letters is restrained,
Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanston's Rep. 402; Woolsey v. J11dd, 4 Duer (N. Y.)
379; or a birth certificate cancelled. Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq.
910. See also cases collected in note to Ex parte Badger, 14 A. L. R. 286.
While the principal case seems to be without direct precedent, it is submitted that the holding is a correct one and is no departure from the established fields of equity jurisdiction.
!NJUNCTION-WASTE-BAI.ANCE OF lNJURY.-There was a devise of a
portion of an estate to the defendant for life, with remainder to the heirs
of his body, and if there should be no heirs of his body, remainder to the
plaintiff. The defendant joined with his nine children in mortgaging the
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premises to secure a loan, and proposed with them to dispose of a portion
of their property to a subdividing company in order to raise sufficient money
to discharge the mortgage and prevent the sale of the land on foreclosure.
The plailltiff, who was a contingent remainderman, sought to enjoin the sale
and subdivision of the property into building lots on the ground that it was
waste, but it was held that equity would not enjoin. Brown v. BroWJi (W.
Va., 1921), rn9 S. E. 815.
It would seem that the court would have been justified in holding that
the acts sought to be enjoined were of such an ameliorating nature as not
to amount to waste. It was held not waste to raze a dwelling house when
changes in the surroundings had made the premises more valuable as business property. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7; see 19 MICH. L.
Riw, ms. The court, however, assumed that these acts would be waste, and
placed its decision upon two grounds: first, that the complainant's interest
was not likely to vest, since it depended upon the double contingency of his
surviving the defendant and the defendant surviving all of his nine children
and their issue; secondly, that the hardship upon the defendant by granting
the injunction would greatly exceed the hardship upon the complainant if
it was refused, which, partly because of the remoteness of his property right,
the court regarded as inconsequential. It appears settled that a contingent
remainderman cannot maintain an action at law for waste. Hunt v. Hall,
37 Me. 363; Taylor v. Adams, 93 Mo. App. 277; Latham v. Lmnber Co.,
139 N. C. 9. In equity it is held that one having a possibility of reverter,
as upon the owners of the fee ceasing to use the land for church purposes,
cannot obtain an injunction against waste. Dees v. Che11vronts, 240 Ill. 486.
See also Curles et al. v. Wade, 151 Ga. 142; Mathews v. H1tdson, 81 Ga. 120.
But although a contingent remainderman cannot succeed at law, he may
obtain an injunctioii against waste. Where the life tenant committed waste
by drilling for oil, it was said that while the contingent remainderman could
not sue for damages nor bring a bill for accounting for past waste, he
could enjoin future waste "for the protection of the inheritance which is
certain, though the person on whom it may fall is uncertain." Ohio Oil Co.
v. Daughetee, 240 Ill. 36!; see also Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co.,
95 Ark. 18. It would seem, therefore, that the fact that the complainant is
a contingent remainderman should have no bearing on the decision in the
principal case, e.."'\:cept as it leads the court to refuse to enjoin waste of a
negligible nature in favor of one whose property interest is uncertain, and
thereby impose a serious present loss on the defendants. The equities favor
the defendant from the standpoint of hardship. But the doctrine of balance
of injury has been generally confined to those cases where the injury to the
defendant from an injunction would be very great, as where it involved
the closing dovin of a lar&"e manufacturing plant, or where, under similar
circumstances, the _suppressing of an important commodity vitally affected
the interests of the public. And on principle the weight of authority is
against the doctrine, because, justifying under the discretion of equity to
grant or refuse an injunction, it determines the legality of claimed rights
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in accordance with their value. See Po:M~OY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (Ed.
2), §§ I943-I945; Hansen v. Cro11ch, g8 Ore, I4I. In Continental Fi1el Co.
v. Haden, I82 Ky. 8, the court was asked to cancel a mining lease upon the
ground that the lessees had committed waste by failing to operate the mines
in a workmanlike manner. This was refused because the injury to complainants was inconsequential as compared to the loss of $100,coo in mining
machinery and equipment installed in the mine by the defendant. It is seen
that this decision is in harmony with the distinction which has been drawn
between the case where the complainant's injury is actually small and the
case where his injury is clearly substantial but proportionately less than the
injury to the defendant. The courts will more readily refuse an injunction
upon balaneing injuries in the former case than in the latter. Campbell v.
Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568. The technical or imponderable nature of the plaintiff's injury seems also to have been considered in Bliss v. Washoe Copper
Co., 109 C. C. A I33· This factor was present in the principal case, since
the beneficial character of the changed use of the property made the plaintiff's injury, if any, purely technical, and, together with the uncertainty of
his ultimate property right, causes the result reached to appear preeminently
just. It should be noted, however, that in the cases above referred to, and
in those cited in POMEROY, S11pra, the plaintiff would have alternative recourse
to a suit for damages at law, while in the principal case, as pointed out
above, refusing an injunction leaves the plaintiff without a remedy. It is
well, however, to confine the relief which equity grants to a contingent
remainderman to those cases in which equitable considerations are more
clearly in his favor.
NEGUGtNCE-PARTY Gun.TY oF CoNTRIBU'.rORY N.EGI.IGENct AS MATTER oF
LAW BtcAUSE STRUCK BY AuTOMOBII,t HAVING RIGHT oF WAY.-While crossing a street at a speed of IS miles an hour the plaintiff was struck by the
defendan~, who was coming along a cross street at 35 miles an hour and
had the right of way by statute. Held, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Anderso1i v. Jenny Motor Co. (Minn.,
I92I), 185 N. W. 378.
The rule laid down in the principal case is taken from the Minnesota
decision of Lendahl v. Morse, I8I N. W. 323, in which negligence in law is
confused with negligence in fact. It is submitted that in the principal case
Holt, J., takes the sounder view in his dissenting opinion when he says:
"There are so many varied circumstances in every accident at a street crossing that the question of whose fault it was should be determined by the
triers of fact." He further points out that "under the rule of the Lindahl
case an ox team could never cross a downtown street of Minneapolis, except
possibly between 2 a. m. and 6 a. m., for some reckless speeders to the right
of the team would surely be in time to hit the rear of the wagon, even if
two blocks away when the team •first entered the intersection." Obviously,
the whole matter of who was to blame for the accident should be left to the
jury with proper instructions as to the law applicable to the circumstances.
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Authority in other jurisdictions is uniformly against the holding in the principal case. A driver having the right of way at a street crossing is not
justified in plunging ahead regardless of consequences nor failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to others. Glatz v. Kroeger Bros. Co.,
168 \Vis. 635. "If we assume the defendant had the right of way the conditions must be such as to justify him in the absolute exercise of the right. In any event, his right on the highway is not exclusive, but •at all times relative and still subject to the fundamental common law doctrine: Sic 1itere
f!to ut alienmn non laedas." Paulse1i v. Kliiige, 92 N. J. L. 99. The right
of precedence at a crossing has no application where one not having that
right approaches the crossing and has no reasonable grounds for apprehending a collision because of the distance from the crossing of one having
such right. Barnes v. Barnett, 184 Iowa 936. Furthermore, "the rule regarding the right of way does not impose upon the person crossing the street
the duty of assuming that the other will continue to cross an intersecting
street without slowing down, as required by law." Whitelaw v. M cGilliard,
179 Cal. 349. Perhaps in the principal case the fact was that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence because of a failure to yield the
defendant the right of way, but whether or not this was so should have
been found as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of law.
PsRJURY-ACQUI't'.L'AL OF CRIME CHARGED NO BAR TO SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION FOR PERJURY.-Defendant was convicted of perjury for giving false
testimony at a previous trial in which he was acquitted of a charge of
receiving stolen property. The conviction of perjury was inconsistent with
the prior acquittal. Held, acquittal was no bar. People v. Niles (Ill., 1921),
133 N. E. 252.
The general rule is that acquittal on a criminal charge is no bar to a
subsequent prosecution of the defendant for perjury. T_he cases of United
States v. B1itler, 38 Fed. 4g8, and Cooper v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 909,
to the contrary, have been seriously questioned and expressly overruled
respectively by Alle1i v. United States, 194 Fed. 664 and Teague v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. 665. In some cases it has been said that if the conviction of perjury necessarily contradicts the previous acquittal, the latter is
a bar. Chitwood v. United States, 178 Fed. 442; State v. Smith, 1i9 Minn.
107. The logic of treating the matter as res judicata is somewhat impaired
by recalling that the prior acquittal was essentially a failure to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rather than a finding that he
was not guilty. Thus, if an acquittal were held conclusive of the fact a
fortiori, a conviction should have the same effect. Sound policy seems to
require that a defendant taking the stand in his own behalf should not be
able to perjure himself with utter impunity, nor should his immunity depend
upon the convincingness with which he lies. For notes and citations of
authorities see 39 L. R. A. (n. s.) 385; L. R. A. 1917 B 743.
PuBI,Ic UTILITY CoRPORATIONS-RIGHT TO D!scoNTINUE SERVICE.-The O
Company entered into a contract with a village to supply it with gas for ten
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years. Its supply of gas failing, the 0 Company made a contract with the
E Company for a supply of gas, the contract being subject to termination
upon six months' notice by either party. By means of the gas thus obtained
the 0 Company was enabled for a time to perform its contract with the
village, but before the term of the contract had expired the E Company
gave notice as required and discontinued its supply of gas to the 0 Company, when then applied to the Public Utilities Commission for permission
to withdraw its gas service and facilities from the village. The E Company
was made a party to the proceedings, but was dismissed on the ground that
the commission could not compel it to supply gas to the village because there
was no contractual obligation between the E Company and the village,
though the charter of the E Company expressly authorized it to supply gas
to the village in question. The 0 Company was given permission to withdraw its service and facilities because of its inability to obtain gas. On
appeal, the order of the commission was affirmed. Village of St. Clairsville
v. Public Utilitiirs Comniission (Ohio, 1921), 132 N. E. 151.
The right of a public utility corporation to discontinue its service seems
uncontested, so far as the general public is concerned, when the corporation
acts with the consent of the state. Jeffries v. Comnwnwealth, 121 Va. 425.
The United States Supreme Court has held that, in the absence of statute
or express contract a public service corporation has the right to discontinue
its entire service when operations are being carried on at ai loss and without
reasonable prospect of future profit. Brooks-Scanlo1i Company v. Railroad
Commission of Louisiana, 251 U. S. 3g6; Bullock v. R. R. Comm. of Florida,
254 U. S. 513. In the latter case the court said: "No implied contract that
they will do so (operate at a loss) can be elicited from the mere fact that
they have accepted a charter from the state and have been allowed to e."'>:ercise the power of eminent domain." Ac.cord, Lyon & Hoag v. Railroad
Commission, 183 Cal. 145; New York Tmst Co. v. Buffalo & L. E. Trac.
Co., 183 N. Y. Supp. 278. To compel operation in such cases would result
in the taking of property without due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Brooks-Scanlo1i Company v. Railroad Commission
of Louisiana, supra. NaturaJly, the courts have not frequently passed upon
the right of a solvent public utility corporation to discontinue its service
entirely. In. support of such a right, see I WYMAN ON Pom.1c SERVICE CoRPORATIONS, §§ 290-313; Mmm v. Illinois, 94 U. S. n3; San Antonio Street
Railway Co. v. Statir of Te%as, go Tex. 520; Gas Co. v. City, 81 Ohio St.
33; Fellows v. Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 52. For opinions contra, see note, L.
R. A. 1915 A 549; Southem Ry. Co. v. Hatchett, 174 Ky. 463. But where
a public utility corporation discontinues its service as to part or all of its
plant it renders its franchises liable to forfeiture. State v. Pawtu%et 1'1mvpike Corp., 8 R. I. 182; The People v. The Albany & Vermont Railroad Co.,
24 N. Y. 261; San Antonio Street Railway Co. v. State of Te%as, supra.
And where the corporation desires to retain its charter the state can compe~
it to render service even on those parts of its system where the operation
results in a financial loss, provided the corporate property as a whole is
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earning a profit. Southenu Ry. Co. v. Hatchett, sttPra; State v. Postal Telegraph Co., 96 Kan. 298; Brownell v. Old Col_o1iy Railroad, 164 Mass. 29;
Colorado, etc., Co. v. Railroad Commission, 54 Colo. 64 But in Ohio, apparently, a corporation under a permissive charter has the right to discontinue
any part of its service which it is not under contractual obligation to furnish. Gas Co. v. City, s1tpra. See also Selectmen of Amesbury v. Citizms'
Elec. St. Ry., 199 Mass. 394; Laighton v. City of Carthage, Mo., 175 Fed. 145.
Ordinarily, where the discontinuance of part of the service results in a benefit
to the public or is necessary to insure the financial success of the part
operated, the state will take no action against the corporation. Iowa v.
Old Colony Trust Co., 215 Fed. 307. At common law, property devoted to a
public use could be withdrawn in any case only after reasonable notice to
the public. I WYMAN ON Punr.1c SERVICE CORPORATIONS, § 316. Many
states now hold that a public utility corporation has no right to discontinue
service without dirst obtaining the consent of the state, acting through its
Public Utilities Commission. People ex rel. Hubbard v. Colorado Title &
Trttst Co., 65 Colo. 472; State v. Postal Telegraph Co.> g6 Kan. 2g8; Sottthern Ry. Co. v. Hatchett, sitpra. The decisions of the commissions are subject to review by the courts. See cases last cited. It is also important to
note that the right to discontinue service does not necessarily include the
right to dismantle the plant. See R. R. Com.missio1~ of Ark. v. Saline River
R'j.1• Co., n9 Ark. 239. Regarding the right to discontinue service, see L.
R. A. 1915 A 549; n A. L. R. 252; 32 HARv. L. REv. 716. In N ortheru
Illinois Light & T. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Conin. (Ill., Feb. 1922), 134
N. E. 142, a public service corporation was engaged in operating a street
railway and also in furnishing light and power to a city. It was held that
where an entire street railroad system was earning a reasonable return the
company could not discontinue service on certain of its lines, even though
those particular lines were not yielding a profit. But the court also held
that the profit earned on one branch of the corporate business-e. g., its
light and power service-could not be considered in determining the right
to discontinue service in regard to another branch of its business-e. g., its
street railway ~ervice-when the latter was being operated at a loss.
TRUSTS-INSURANCE TO A BENEFICIARY WITHIN PERMITTED CLASS IN
TRUST FOR PERSON OUTSIDE Cr.Ass.-Insured took out $5,000 of insurance
with the Bureau of War Risk Insurance in favor of his mother. He desired
to take out another $5,ooo policy in favor of his fiancee, but was informed
he could not name her as beneficiary. He_ thereupon took out the additional
insurance in favor of his mother, but wrote a letter to his fiancee stating
that his mother would pay over the money from the second policy to her.
Held, evidence not sufficient to establish the existence of an executed trust.
Semble, an attempt upon the part of the insured to accomplish by indirection
what the statute forbids is illegal and unenforceable. Caessna v. Adams
(N. J., 1921), us AtL 802.
The decisions are conflicting in cases like the above where the insured

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS

805

names a beneficiary within the permitted class, but charges this beneficiary
with a trust to hold the proceeds of the policy for one outside the class.
In Massachusetts the rule is that the next of kin, who would have been
entitled in case no beneficiary were named, is entitled to the proceeds of the
policy. O'Brim v. Mass. Cath. Order of Foresters, 220 Mass. 79. Kerr v.
Crane, 212 Mass. 224 seems to decide that the intended beneficiary outside
the class is entitled, but this is explained in the O'Brim case, supra, by the
fact that the next of kin intervened in favor of the intended beneficiary.
In some jurisdictions it has been held that the defense is one purely personal with the insurer. If the insurer does not object, the intended beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds of the policy. Meyers v. Schumami, 54
N. J. Eq. 414 In a suit by the intended beneficiary against the named beneficiary, who agreed to hold in trust, the general rule is that the intended
beneficiary will prevail. 40 L. R. A. (n. s.) 692, note and cases cited. But
equity should do complete justice, and although the suit is only one between
the intended beneficiary and the named beneficiary, the outcome should not
be different than if all parties were joined. The prohibition against naming
certain classes of persons as beneficiaries was adopted by the insurance com•
pany for a purpose, and the insured assented to this when he took out the
policy. Should not a court of equity declare that an attempt to evade this
prohibition is void and give the proceeds of the policy to the next of kin
or to such persons as would have been entitled if no beneficiary were named?
WATERS AND WATER CoURsts-EFFF.cr oF DtsF.RT LAND Acr.-The Act
of March 3, 1877, generally known as the Desert Land Act, provides for the
sale of desert lands to persons who agree to irrigate and cultivate such lands.
The act defines desert lands as lands which will not, without some irrigation, produce crops, and provides that the Commissioner of the General
Land Office shall determine what may be considered as such lands; it provides also that the right to the use of water on such lands shall depend
upon appropriation, and continues as follows: "and all surplus water over
and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all
lakes, rivers, and other sources of water supply upon the public lands * * *
shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public
for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes, subject to existing
rights." Defendants were appropriators of water from Spearfish Creek,
· and plaintiffs (apparently since March 3, 1877) had acquired title to lands
bordering on that stream; defendants diverted all the water in the stream
during a dry summer, in order to satisfy their appropriations, and plaintiffs
brought an action to determine their riparian rights. It did not appear that
either the riparian lands of plaintiffs or the lands on which the defendants
used the appropriated water had been obtained under the Desert Land Act.
Held, that no riparian rights exist in connection with any public lands
granted by the government after the passage of the Desert Land Act. Cook
et al. v. Evans et al. (S. ·D., 1921), 185 N. W. 262.
In a similar case in California appropriators sued to prevent the use
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of water by upper riparian owners who had obtained title from the government after I877. Held, that as defeE_dants' title was not obtained under the
Desert Land Act, that act did not apply, and defendants could use the water
as riparian owners. San J.oaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Cd.,
Inc., v. Worswick et al. (Cal., I922), 203 Pac. 999.
The opposed views of the two cases reflect the condition of the previous
decisions on this point. In Hough v. Porter, 51 Ore. 318, which is cited in
both cases and followed by the South Dakota court, the supreme court of
Oregon held that all lands settled upon after March 3, 1877, "were accepted
with the implied understanding that the first to appropriate and use the
water for the purposes specified in the act should have the superior right
thereto." On the other hand, the supreme court of Washington, in Sti1l v.
Palouse Irrigation & P()wer Co., 64 Wash. 6o6, held that the provisions of
th11 statute applied only to desert lands as defined therein, and did not apply
to lands (or to streams thereon) title to which was obtained from the government under other statutes. Both decisions have been followed and
affirmed by later cases in the same jurisdictions. There is no actual authority
in the United States courts. Winters v. U. S., 143 Fed. 740, though sometimes cited as opposed to Hough v. Porter, .mpra, is decided on another
ground. In Bogiwillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 2I3 U. S. 339, the court
finds it unnecessary to decide the question raised in the two principal cases,
but refers to the decision in Hoitgh v. Porter, siipra, as being based on
"plausible grounds." As to the text writers, Mr. Kinney (Sec. 8I7) criticises Hough v. Porter, while Mr. Wiel (Secs. I28-I30) merely refers to the
doctrine of that case as "a new phase of the law," and Mr. Long (Sec. 3o6)
rather hazily inclines to Mr. Kinney's views~ It seems clear that the question is still an open one.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS-INJURIES RECEIVED WHILE ACTING IN
AN EMERGENCY AS "ARISING

OuT

OF AND IN THE

CouR.ss

OF EMPLOYMENT."-

The plaintiff's intestate, employed as a gardener by the defendant company,
was severely injured while attempting to stop a team of horses which had
run away from the defendant's receiving platform near which he had been working. The team belonged to a drayman who had been delivering goods
to the defendant company at the receiving platform, which was located
within the latter's grounds. Held, an injury "arising out of and in the
course of employment." Sebo v. Libby, McNeil & Libby (Mich., I92l), 185
N. W. 702.
The plaintiff, a chambermaid,_ after retiring to her . room in the hotel
for the night, lighted an alcohol lamp with ~which to heat a curling iron.
After she had finished curling her hair she left the room momentarily, and
on returning discovered that the lamp had started a fire. In extinguishing
the fire she was severely burned. The chambermaids had been expressly
forbidden to use lamps like the one in question. Held, an injury "arising
out of and in the course of employment." Kraff v. West Hotel Co. (Ia..,
1921), 185 N. W. 895.
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As to what circumstances may constitute an "emergency," see 25 HARV.
L. REv. 416-418. The cases quite uniformly hold that a workman is still
within the scope of his employment when, confronted with an emergency,
he performs acts to protect his employer's property, even though such acts
are entirely different from those included in his regularly appointed duties.
Rees v. Thomas (1899], l Q. B. 1015 (mine worker injured while stopping
employer's runaway horse) ; Baum v. Industrial Com., 288 Ill. 516 (factory
employee injured in defending employer's factory against strikers); Southem Surety Co. v. Stubbs (Tex. Civ. App.), 199 S. W. 343 (engineer injured
while trying to save his employer's vessel from shipwreck). For a collection of cases, see note, 6 A. L. R. 1247. Recovery has been allowed where
the employee was mistaken in his belief that danger to his employer's property was imminent. Harriso1~ v. Whitaker Bros., 16 T. L. R. 108 (employee
i~)ured while attempting to adjust a switch which he believed was not
pr-0perly set for an approaching train, but which, in fact, was in good order,
being worked automatically). The same general rule applies where an
employee performs acts to save himself or other employees from injury for
which the employer would be liable. Rist v. Larkili & Sangster, 156 N. Y.
Supp. 875; U11ited States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission,
174 Cal. 616; London & E. Shipping Co. v. Brown (1905], Scot. Sess. Cas.
488. Most of the courts limit the rule to cases like the above, where the
employee acts in furtherance of the employer's "material interests." Recovery has been denied when an employee was injured while protecting his
employer from physical injury. Clark v. Clark, 189 Mich. 652; Collins v.
Collins [1907], 2 I. R. 104- And where an employee was injured while rescuing a fellow employee from the danger of an injury for which the employer
would not have been liable. Mullm v. Stewart & Co. (1908], Scot. Sess.
Cas. 991·. But see Ii~ re Waters v. T~ylor Co., 218 N. Y. 248, where recovery
was allowed to the employee of one contractor who was injured while rescuing the employee of another contractor, both being engaged in work on
the same building. The court based its decision on the economic and humanitarian principles underlying the Workmen's Compensation Act and the fact
that the act was "within the reasonable anticipation" of the employer. See
also Priglise v. Fonda, J. & G. R. Co., 183 N. Y. Supp. 414, commented
upon in 20 Cor.UM. L. REv. 919. There is no settled rule regarding cases
where the employee's wrongful conduct is the cause of the emergency. In
Hapel111a1~ v. Poole, 25 T. L. R. 155, an employee had been left in charge
of some caged lions and in trying to drive back into its cage one tlfat had
. escaped the employee was killed. The court in allowing recovery declared
that whether or not the escape of the lion was due to the employee's misconduct was unimportant, since wilful misconduct did not excuse the employer
from liability where the injury resulted in death or serious and permanent
disablement. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 6 Edw. VII, c. 58, sec.
l (2) (c). In Powell v. La11arkshir.e Steel Co. (1904], Scot. Sess. Cas. 1039,
an employee for his own pleasure, and contrary to orders, climbed into a
car standing on a track at the top bf a steep incline. He thus set the car
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in motion, and while attempting to prevent its descent down the incline he
suffered injuries from which he later died. The court denied relief on the
ground that the wilful misconduct of the employee was the ultimate cause
of the accident. The statute in that case denied recovery for all injuries
due to the serious and wilful misconduct of the employee. Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1897, 6o-61 Viet., c. 37, sec. l. The decision in the first
of the principal cases, supra, is in accord with the general rule; that in the
second seems sound in view of the fact that the Iowa statute denies relief
for injuries due to misconduct only when the injury is due to the employee's
intoxication or his wilful intention to injure himself or another. Compiled
Code of Iowa, 1919, Sec. 8o8. Moreover, allowing relief even in ~ases where
the misconduct of the employee has imperiled the employer's property will
carry out the public policy underlying the Workmen's Compensation Acts
and serve as an incentive to the employee to protect his employer's property.

